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 This Paper draws on a paper presented by R Woellner at ALTA in 2007, "Is the ATO a law unto itself?", and 
the authors thank Prof Stephen Graw for his perceptive comments on that earlier Paper. 
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As a Commonwealth Government Department, the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) is 
required by Appendix B to the Legal Services Directions 2005
2
 to act as a “model litigant”, 
i.e. as a “moral exemplar” when conducting litigation in behalf of the Commonwealth.  The 
genesis of the principles underpinning the model litigant rooms can be traced back to the 
observations of Chief Justice Sir Samuel Griffith in Melbourne Steamship Ltd v Moorehead
3
, 
where he lamented that: 
“’’’ I cannot refrain from expressing my surprise that [a technical point of pleading] 
should be taken on behalf of the Crown“.  It used to be regarded as axiomatic that the 
Crown never takes technical points, even in civil proceedings, and a fortiori not in 
criminal proceedings. 
I am somewhat inclined to think that in some parts - not all - of the Commonwealth, 
the old-fashioned traditional, and almost instinctive, standards of fair play to be 
observed by the Crown in dealing with subjects, which I learned a very long time ago 
to regard as elementary, is either not known or thought out of date. I should be glad to 
think that I’m mistaken”. 
Translated subsequently into statutory form, the key underpinning principle in Appendix B is 
“the obligation” in clause 1, which states that: 
“Consistently with the Attorney-General’s responsibility for the maintenance of 
proper standards in litigation, the Commonwealth and its agencies are to behave as 
model litigant in the conduct of litigation”4. 
The balance of the Appendix goes on to spell out the daunting “nature” of this obligation, and 
requires agencies involved in litigation
5
 to: 
 act honestly and fairly in handling claims and litigation… By dealing with claims 
promptly and not causing unnecessary delay (cl 2 (a))
6
; 
 make an early assessment of the prospects of success and the Commonwealth’s 
potential liability (cl 2(aa)); 
 pay legitimate claims without litigation… where it is clear that liability is at least as 
much as the amount to be paid (cl 2(b)); 
 act consistently in handling claims and litigation (cl 2(c))7; 
                                                          
2
  Schedule to the Legal Services Directions 2005, made under section 55ZF of the Judiciary Act 1903 “Appendix 
B: The Commonwealth's obligation to act as a model litigant"; see P & C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing 
Board [1973] 2 NSWLR 366, 383. 
3
 (1912)15 CLR 133 at 342.  See also Kenny v State of South Australia (1987) 46 SASR 268 at 273; Yong Jun Quin 
v The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155; and Scott v Handley (No 2) [1999] FCA 
404, [44]-[45] (Spender, Finn and Weinberg JJ). 
4
 T Brennan, “Model Litigant law and the Legal services Directions”, provides a useful overview of the 
Directions and issues (accessed 27 August 2013); R Jorgensen and M Bishop ,”The rule of law and the model 
litigant rules” (June 2011) 45/11 TIA 678. . 
5
 the Directions apply both to tribunal at court litigation, and to both merits review and judicial review: 
Jorgensen and Bishop, above, 679. 
6
 See Kenny v State of South Australia (1987) 46 SASR 268, 273 (King CJ). 
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 endeavour to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal proceedings wherever 
possible, including by giving consideration all cases to alternative dispute resolution 
before initiating legal proceedings… (cl 2 (d)); 
 when it is not possible to avoid litigation, keep the cost of litigation to a minimum by 
various means (cl 2(e)(i)-(iv)); 
 not take advantage of the claimant lacks the resources to litigate a legitimate claim (cl 
2(f)); 
 not rely on technical defences (unless the Commonwealth’s or the agency’s interest 
would be prejudiced by the failure to comply with a particular requirement)l 2(g))
8
; 
 not undertake and pursue appeals unless the agency believes that it has reasonable 




 apologising with the agency is aware that it or its lawyers have acted wrongfully or 
improperly (cl 2(i)). 
 In merit review proceedings, an agency should use its best endeavours to assist the 
tribunal to make its decision (cls 3 and 4). 
Notes 2-4 to Appendix B summarise the key elements of the model litigant rules in stating 
that: 
“Note 2 In essence, being a model litigant requires that the Commonwealth and its 
agencies, as parties to litigation, and with complete propriety, fairly and in accordance 
with the highest professional standards… 
Note 3 The obligation to act as a model litigant may require more than merely acting 
honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules. It also goes beyond the 
requirement for lawyers to act in accordance with the ethical obligations. 
Note 4 The obligation does not prevent the Commonwealth and agencies from acting 
firmly and properly to protect their interests. It does not therefore preclude all 
legitimate steps being taken to pursue claims by the Commonwealth and its agencies 
and testing were defending claims against them. It does not preclude pursuing 
litigation in order to clarify a significant point of law if the other party wishes to settle 
the dispute…”. 
These are indeed daunting standards to reach, particularly as it has been suggested that judges 
have tended to be unsympathetic to governmental “excuses” for breaches of the Directions10, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7
 Jorgensen and Bishop (above, 681)criticise the approach taken by the ATO to its rest case litigation program 
on the basis that PS LA 2009/9 para 8 indicates that the ATO makes funding decisions on political rather than 
legal or meritorious grounds, contrary the to the rule of law and the Model Litigant Directions. 
8
 Young v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155, 166 (Beaumont, Burchett and 
Goldberg JJ). 
9
 Compare Brennan (above), 7-8. 
10
 A Tsacalos, “The model litigant policy in the spotlight”, 
http:?/www.mondaq.com/404.asp?404;http://www.momdaq.com:80/Australia/x/144208 (accessed 1 
September 2013. 
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and it is perhaps therefore not surprising (but no less lamentable) that the ATO and other 
Commonwealth departments have failed to comply with their model litigant obligations on 
numerous occasions..  However, this reflects the importance of the Directions, because as 
Jorgensen and Bishop observe, “The quality of the ATO’s compliance with the rule of law 
and model litigant rules determines the public’s confidence in [the ATO] as an institution”.11 
There are statutory sanctions for breach of the Directions, including under Cl 14.1 the 
statutory discretion of the Attorney-General to “impose sanctions for non-compliance”12, and 
the possibility that a court hearing a case where the Directions were breached might award 
costs against the government department involved.
13
 
However, there are also what might be seen as flaws in the structure of the Directions; in 
particular, under s 55ZG(2),(3) Judiciary Act 1903: 
 (2) Compliance with a … Direction is not enforceable except by, or upon the 
application of, the Attorney-General. 
 (3) The issue of non-compliance with a … Direction may not be raised in any 
proceeding (whether in a court, tribunal or other body) except by, or on behalf of, the 
Commonwealth”:  
Accordingly, a private litigant cannot take steps to enforce a Legal Services Direction.  This 
can lead to anomalous outcomes.
14
  
It has been suggested that the list of obligations above is not exhaustive
15
, but in any event 
they are lofty ideals, representing an important expression of the rule of law
16
.  Balancing the 
strictures of the model litigant principles with the right of an agency to act “firmly and 
properly to protect its interests” is not easy, and perhaps therefore it is not surprising that the 
ATO sometimes fall short of the required level.  
However, given the importance of the principles, any lapse is undesirable, and the 
Commonwealth Attorney General indicated in 2011 that any breach of the guidelines was 
“unacceptable”. Regrettably, there appear to have been a number of lapses on the part of the 
ATO - not that the ATO is alone in this, as problems have also arisen in other 
                                                          
11
 R Jorgensen and M Bishop, “The rule of law and the model litigant rules”, (June 2011 45(11) TIA, 678. 
12
 The range of sanctions and their application are outlined in Compliance Strategy for Enforcement of the 
Legal Services Directions 
13
 See eg ACCC v ANZ [2010] FCA 567.  In Deputy Commr of Taxation v Clear Blue Development Pty Ltd (No 2) 
[2010] FCA 1224, Justice Logan rejected an application by the ATO for a costs order, commenting that “… to do 
so would be to reward work which is not of a standard to be expected of a person [who is] a solicitor on the 
record for a person to whom the model litigant obligations adhere”; cf Phillips, in the matter of Starrs & Co Pty 
Ltd In Liquidation)v Commr of Taxation [2011] FCA 532, [3] (Lander J).  The ATO was ordered to pay indemnity 
costs FC of T v Clark (No 2) [2011] FCAFC 140. 
14
 As for example in Denlay (above.  Brennan (above), 10, mounts an argument that “the [core] Principle”, as 
distinct from the Directions, “exists at general law and is enforceable through the general law.  The directions, 
if relevant, will serve merely to elucidate the content of the Principle in a particular case”; contrast Jorgensen 
and Bishop, above 679, who put the orthodox view. 
15
 T Brennan, “Model Litigant Law and the Legal Services Directions”, above, 9. 
16
 R Jorgensen and M Bishop, “The rule of law and the model litigant rules”, (2011) 45/11 TIA 678, 678-9.  








; Qantas Airways 
Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia - Fair Work Ombudsman v Transport Workers 
Union of Australia
20
; CSR (Vic) v Landrow Properties Pty Ltd
21
; Moline and Comcare
22
; 
ACCC v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 2
23
); and Shah & Ors v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship & Anor 
24
. 
Indeed, the Commonwealth Attorney-General identified a total of 35 breaches of the Model 
Litigant Directions by Commonwealth government departments in 2008-09
25
, 24 in 2009-10, 
17 in 2010-11, and 42 in 2011-12
26
 
That said, the ATO has had a number of well-publicised problems in recent times, including: 
 Phillips v Commr of Taxation27 (court was critical of the ATO’s failure to file an 
affidavit within time after 3 extensions; awarded indemnity costs to the taxpayer); 
 FC of T v Denlay  28 (ATO did not regard action in seeking to enforce assessment 
debts which would bankrupt the taxpayer did not constitute “hardship”, an assertion 
characterised by the Court as “preposterous”); 
 DC of T v Clear Blue Developments Pty Ltd (No 2)29 (Court was critical of the 
standard of ATO work in the litigation; refused to award costs to the ATO) 
 AAT Case [2011] James & Anor 30 (ATO ignored evidence of the existence of a debt). 
Perhaps the two most striking and illustrative recent examples of breaches of the model 
litigant rules by the ATO which are worthy of closer examination are FC of T v 
                                                          
17
 M Taylor-Sands and C Cameron; see below). The Attorney-General’s Annual Report 2009-10 identified 35 
breaches in 2008/9 [subsequently corrected to 24 – see the Cth Attorney-General (OLS) Fact Sheet below), 
leading Civil Liberties Australia to suggest that there had been an apparent decline in the behaviour of 
government departments (B Rowlings, “The very model of a model litigant”, http://www.cla.asn.au/News/the-
very-model-of -a-model-litigant -  accessed 1 September 2013.   From this perspective, the increase to 42 (70% 
of all cases finalised) in 2011-12 is disturbing.   
18
 [2010] NSWCA 331. 
19
 [2009] QCA 351. 
20
 [2011] FCA 470; 
21
 [2010] VSCA 197. 
22
 [2003] AATA 827;  
23
 [2010] FCA 567 
24
[2011] HCA Trans 196 (8 August 2011). 
25 Though allegations of breached Directions do not always succeed: Western City Developments Pty Ltd 
v Chief Commr of State Revenue (No 2) [2010] NSWADTAP 72. 
26
 “Compliance and reporting” fact sheet, Cth Attorney-General’s website – accessed 6 September 2013. In the 
same periods, the number of alleged breaches which were investigated and found to be compliant with the 
Directions were: 30 (33.3%) in 2009-10; 8 (32%) in 2010-11; and 18 (30%) in 2011-12. 
27
 [2011] FCA 532. 
28
 [2010] QCA 217. 
29
 [2010] FCA 1124. 
30
 Reported in Weekly Tax  - Issue 4, 28 Jan 2011.Bulletin 
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Indooroopilly Children Services (Qld) Pty Ltd 
31(“Indooroopilly”)) and LVR (WA) Pty Ltd 
v Administrative Appeals Tribunal
32
 (“LVR”). 
The Indooroopilly saga began with the decision by Kiefel J in Essenbourne v Commr of 
Taxation (Commonwealth
33
, the issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to a 
deduction for payment which they had made to a superannuation fund in relation to 
employee share plan, and whether that payment created a taxable fringe benefit. Her 
Honour held in relation to the fringe benefits issue that they could only be a taxable fringe 
benefit where the ATO was able to identify a particular and pleaded in the benefit was 
provided (rather than a general benefit provided to employees at large). 
The ATO had long held the view that the “general benefit” approach was correct34 and 
did not accept that Kiefel J’s decision correctly state of the law. The Commissioner then 
issued a Media Release indicating that the ATO would not appeal against the decision in 
Essenbourne because the Commissioner had in effect “won” the case (as Kiefel J had 
held that the payment to the fund was not deductible) so that there was no basis on which 
the ATO could appeal on the FBT point, but that the ATO did not accept the correctness 
of Kiefel J’s decision on this point, and would - contrary to that decision - continue to 
apply the “general benefit” interpretation and accordingly disallow objections based on 
the specific benefit approach. 
The ATO remarkably - but true to its word - subsequently argued its “general benefit” 
FBT point over a period of three years in a series of AAT and single judge Federal Court 
decisions
35
 where the ATO lost on each occasion. 
When the opportunity arose again in 2007, the ATO ran the same argument before the 
Full Federal Court in Indooroopilly.  In that case, a particular child care centre group 
wanted to set up an employee share scheme under which it would gift a number of its 
shares to a discretionary trust as the corpus of the trust, with the potential class of 
beneficiaries limited to employees of “franchisees” (including Indooroopilly) operating 
related child-care centres.  The child-care centre group sought an ATO ruling on whether 
the issue of its shares would generate a fringe benefit to either its subsidiary or any of the 
franchisee operations. The ATO ruled that the issue of shares would create a fringe 
benefit in respect of the franchisees, but not in relation subsidiary. The case then went on 
appeal to the Full Federal Court, which held that the ATO’s long held interpretation was 
wrong, and that as indicated by the previous cases a fringe benefit only arise where there 
the benefit was provided to particular employees. 
                                                          
31
 2007 ATC 4236. 
32
 [2012] FCAFC 90. 
33
 2002 ATC 5210; Jorgensen and Bishop, above, 679. 
34
 see Taxation Ruling TR 9099/5, paras 45-49 
35
 Benstead Services Pty Ltd v FC of T (AAT) 2006 ATC 2511, 2521 (Hack, McDermott and Kenny); Walstern v FC 
of T 2003 ATC 5076 (Hill J, Federal Court); Spotlights Stores Pty LTV v FC of T 2004 ATC 4674, 4704 (Merkel J – 
Federal Court); Caelli. Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd v FC of T 2005 ATC 4938, 4950-1 (Kenny J, Federal Court); and 
Cameron Brae v FC of T 206 ATC 4433 (Ryan J, Federal Court). 
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The ATO indicated that it would not seek special leave to appeal the FBT point to the I 
Court, but reversing its previous approach, would henceforth apply the law as expounded 
(or confirmed) by the Full Federal Court. 
The present purposes, the key point in the Indooroopilly decision were the comments 
made by members of the court in relation to the way the ATO had conducted the litigation 
before it, and the question of whether the ATO had acted as a “model litigant” in the 
litigation. 
The Federal Court noted that submissions made by the ATO counsel to the Court had 
suggested that decisions such as Business World Computers Pty Ltd v Australia 
Telecommunications Commission
36
 indicated that: 
“8.   the fact that there are single judge decisions on the meaning of “fringe benefit” does 
not mean that the Commissioner was bound to follow those decisions as against tax 
payers who are not privy to those decisions [and] 
9. There is no principle of estoppel would bind the Commissioner to apply the single 
judge decisions to which the respondent was not a party …”37.  This position was 
supported by advice from the Commonwealth Solicitor-General that as an administrator, 
the ATO was  
“… not part of the judicial hierarchy and is not bound by the doctrines of precedent as 
is a lower court.  Accordingly, in appropriate circumstances, it would be legitimate for 
[the ATO] to depart from existing judicial decisions in order to produce a further test 
case seeking to overturn those decisions and uphold the [ATO’s] view as to the 
correct legal position”.38  
The Bench reacted strongly to this proposition, with Edmonds J observing that “a 
proposition such that the Commissioner does not have to obey the law as declared by the 
courts until it gets a decision that he likes was astonishing”39, while Allsop J was equally 
critical, commenting that: 
“… Taxpayers appeared to be in the position of seeing a superior court of record in 
the exercise of Federal jurisdiction declaring the meaning and proper content of a law 
of the Parliament, the executive branch of the government, in the form of the 
Australian Taxation Office, administering the statute in a manner contrary to the 
meaning and content as declared by the court; that is, seeing the executive branch of 
government ignoring the views of the judicial branch of government in the 
administration of a law of the Parliament by the former. This should not have 
                                                          
36




 Quoted in Jorgensen and Bishop, 679, who note that this advice was subject to a number of caveats. It 
would be interesting to see the ATO reaction to a taxpayer who declined to follow a decision of a single 
Federal Court judge which favoured the ATO, on the basis that the taxpayer did not agree with it and wanted 
to wait for a full court decision before complying (see Jorgensen and Bishop, above, 679-680)! 
39
 2007 ATC, 4255. 
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occurred. If the [ATO] has the view that the courts have misunderstood the meaning 
of a statute, steps can be taken to vindicate the perceived correct interpretation on 
appeal or by prompt institution of other proceedings, or the executive can seek to 
move the legislative branch of government to change the statute… Considered 
[determination of a court to determine the meaning of a statue] is a not to be ignored 
by the executive as inter partes rulings binding only in the earlier lis ”.40 
Allsop J went on to criticise the “inferential suggestion in argument” that the ATO was 
“somehow” required by unidentified legislation to administer the law in accordance with its 
“own view of the law and the meaning of statutory provisions, rather than by following the 
courts have declared”.41 
Subsequently, McHugh J observed in a paper presented to an Australian Bar Association 
Conference, was equally scathing, commenting that: 
“Judicial decisions are not provisional rulings until confirmed by the ultimate 
appellate court in the system.  Until set aside, they represent the law and should be 
followed … Even more difficult to justify is the refusal to follow a ruling that is not 
the subject of appeal merely because the agency regards it as wrong and will test it at 
the next opportunity …”.42 
The strength of the comments by the Full Court generated considerable discussion, with some 
attacking the ATO’s approach43, while others defended it44   It is possible to feel some 
sympathy for the ATO’s dilemma45, but it is hard to disagree with Jorgensen and Bishop’s 
comment that the ATO’s disregard for singe judge decisions “demonstrates disregard for the 
fundamental principles underlying the rule of law.”46 
Whatever conclusion one draws from the Indooroopilly saga, the ATO approach did not sit 
well with the Model Litigant Directions. As argued elsewhere
47, regardless of the ATO’s 
                                                          
40
 Allsop J, quoting Marshall CJ in Marbury versus Madison 5 US 87, at 111, and Mahoney J in P & C Canterella v 
Egg Marketing Board [1973] 2 NSWLR 366, 383. 
41
 2007 ATC, 4239. 
42
 Quoted by Jorgensen and Bishop, above , 679 (fn 24). 
43
 see for example M Robertson  "A disregard of the law - Commissioner of Taxation v Indooroopilly Children 
Services (Queensland) Pty Ltd", 2007 41/11 TIA 635, 636; , who argued that the ATO's approach in 
Indooroopilly amounted to a breach of the rule of law at the boundary between the proper roles of the 
executive and Judiciary under the separation of powers doctrine; while P Nicols and C Peadon, "Is the Tax 
Office turning over a new leaf used approach to dispute resolution?", Allens Arthur Robinson 2007 Focus- Tax”.   
44
 D Davies QC "The relationship between the Commissioner of Taxation and the Judiciary", 2000 741/11 TIA, 
630 argued that it is difficult to obtain legislative time in Federal Parliament to pass amendments, and 
declaratory orders would not have been available to the Commissioner in the circumstances, so that taking a 
matter on appeal was the only practical method for the Commissioner to bring the issue to the Full Federal 
Court.. 
45
 As Davies observed, the ATO might  find it difficult to persuade the government to allocate parliamentary 
time and resources to amend the legislation, and it was not clear that the ATO could have obtained declaratory 
orders (see Woellner, above), so that the ATO’s approach may have seemed the only one likely to produce 
results. 
46
 Jorgensen and Bishop, above, 6579-680. 
47
 Woellner "Is the ATO a law unto itself?", ALTA 2007, above, 
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views on the justification of such procedures, the subsequent findings by the Inspector-
General of Taxation that the ATO uses litigation to confirm its view of the law for 
compliance purposes, rather than clarification, and that declining improperly follow decisions 
of court or tribunal’s involved the ATO in some cases acting outside the rule of law reflect a 
strong perception in the community and tax profession that the ATO’s approach was not 
consistent with the spirit (at least) of the model litigant directions. 
Some five years after the decision in Indooroopilly, the decision in LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
48
 saw a differently constituted Full Federal Court again 
highly critical of the ATO’s litigious practices. 
LVR involved an equally extraordinary set of facts. In that case, the AAT had dismissed a 
taxpayer’s claim without (apparently) considering a key affidavit supporting the taxpayer’s 
case. Apparently the reasons of the AAT, which extended to 59 paragraphs (some 29 pages), 
were “with the exception of a small number of words, phrases and sentences, were taken 
verbatim and without attribution from the written submissions filed in the Tribunal on behalf 
the Commissioner.   Approximately 95% of the paragraphs of the reasons were so taken from 
the Commissioner’s written submissions filed in the Tribunal before the hearing in the 
Tribunal … and a further three or four paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons were taken from 
the Commissioner’s written reply… to the written submissions of the appellants before the 
Tribunal.”  However, the Commissioner’s written submissions had not referred to the 
(amended) content of a key affidavit, and the AAT did not refer to it in its reasons. 
Neither counsel for the Commissioner nor counsel for the taxpayer drew the attention of the 
Federal Court the fact that 95% of the tribunal’s reasons had been copied verbatim from the 
Commissioner’s various submissions.  This led the Court to observe that: 
“24. Some days before this appeal came on for hearing, the Court drew the attention 
of the parties the apparent extent of the verbatim copying without attribution of the 
Commissioner’s submissions by the Tribunal and the apparent history of the draft 
although submissions. Neither of these matters had been addressed in the written 
submissions of the parties filed for the purposes of the appeal to the Full Court.  One 
of the matters on which the Court sought the assistance of the parties was how it was 
that submissions came to be put to the primary judge in the form recorded… 
[25] the Commissioner’ response at the Full Court hearing… Was not an adequate or 
appropriate response… 
[27] We remain gravely concerned that the very unusual circumstances we have 
outlined above were not sufficiently drawn the attention of the primary judge… 
31.  The Commissioner did not tell the primary judge that [25] of the reasons of the 
tribunal was taken word for word and without attribution from the Commissioner’s 
reply submissions to the Tribunal…32.  Similarly, the primary judge was taken to 
[48” bracket of the reasons of the Tribunal without being told that that paragraph was 
                                                          
48
 [2012] FC AFC 90 (North, Logan and Robertson JJ). 
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copied verbatim from paragraph 45 of the Commissioner’s submissions [the court 
gave other examples of similar instances]… 
39.  We have given examples of the way the case was conducted before the primary 
judge. We conclude that neither the extent of the unattributed copying or the fact that 
what was copied from the Commissioner’s submissions did not refer to it was not 
updated to take account of the Schokker affidavit was drawn to the attention of the 
primary judge.  
40.  In our opinion if the appellant’s failed fully to explain the position to the primary 
judge then the can Commissioner should have done so to make sure the primary judge 
understood the full circumstances.… Neither was the extent of the copying or the 
history of what was copied apparent to the Full Court from the opening written 
submission of the parties. We continue to have difficulty in understanding why 
counsel for the parties did not fully explain these matters to the primary judge. 
Counsel for the appellants had not appeared in the matter before the Tribunal so that 
may provide some explanation. But counsel for the Commissioner had so appeared. In 
addition, the Commissioner was or should have been acting as a model litigant. 
42.  Speaking generally and without reflecting on counsel who appeared before us, 
being a model litigant requires the Commonwealth and its agencies, as parties to 
litigation, to act with complete propriety, fairly and in accordance with the highest 
professional standards. This obligation may require more than merely acting honestly 
and in accordance with the law and court rules. It also goes beyond the requirement 
for lawyers to act in accordance with the ethical obligations… The Crown… Powers 
are exercised for the public good. It has no legitimate private interest in the 
performance of its functions. And often it is large and as X to greater resources the 
private litigants. Hence must act as a moral exemplar… In our opinion, counsel 
representing the executive government must pay scrupulous attention to what the 
discharge of that obligation requires, especially where legal representatives 
independent of the agency are not involved in the litigation… 
78 In our opinion, if these matters had been drawn to the attention of the primary 
judge two things would have followed. First, submissions the primary judge in the 
form which we have referred would not have been put or, if put, sustained. Second it 
would have been apparent to the primary judge, as it is to us, that the Tribunal had 
failed to take into account the substance of the Schokker affidavit. ”49 
The Full Court’s criticism of the approach taken by counsel for both parties is telling, though 
particularly so in the case of counsel for the Commissioner. It is difficult to understand why 
the issue of the failure to consider the Schokker affidavit was not put more directly to the 
primary judge and the Full Court, and the unattributed verbatim copying disclosed - at least 
by counsel for the Commissioner, who must have been aware from the first instance appeal of 
the extent of the unattributed copying.  
                                                          
49
 LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v AAT [2012] FCAFC 90, [24]-[42], [78] (North, Logan and Robertson JJ)  
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Be that as it may, the course of proceedings did not reflect well on the ATO or its 
representatives, and is difficult to reconcile with the obligation to act as a “moral exemplar” 
and model litigant.  
Of course, as the Full Court pointed out, counsel for the taxpayer also failed to alert the court 
to the extraordinary unattributed copying, though presumably taxpayer’s counsel before the 
Full Court had been simply unaware of the issue, since they would have had strong reasons 
for disclosing the facts to the primary judge and Full Court, as the content of the affidavit was 
presumably favourable to their case.  It seems likely that private litigants sometime stray 
from the path of ethical rectitude (though the traditional view has been that the standards 




Moral exemplars and intellectual gatekeepers – framing the analysis 
One of our key responsibilities as intellectual gatekeepers (and moral exemplar) is to develop 
students’ minds and critical, analytical, and judgemental capacity. This cannot be achieved 
optimally if we adopt a partisan or extreme approach to contentious issues, because. 
experience suggests that (many) students are impressionable, and tend to be influenced by the 
value systems and value judgments of respected academic teachers.   
Accordingly, the way that we react as academics and teachers (through our writings and 
teachings) to issues such as those thrown up by Indooroopilly and LVR is important, as it may 
influence student attitudes and perspectives.   
There is no “right” answer to issues such as those exemplified in Indooroopilly and LVR, 
which are multidimensional and multilayered - and therefore offer a wonderful opportunity to 
engage in sophisticated analysis of policy, practice and human frailty.  We should embrace 
these opportunities, and given our responsibilities as intellectual gatekeepers, ensure that we 
observe our moral duty to be balanced in our analysis.  If – at one extreme - we use such 
instances to demonise the ATO (as we have observed sometimes occurs in relation to 
contentious provisions), we may send our students out into the (tax) world with a jaundiced 
view of and approach to the ATO.  If – at the other extreme – we pass such instances off as 
infrequent and inevitable (and matched by similar breaches by taxpayer representatives), we 
discourage critical thinking and devalue the importance of ethics and the rule of law. 
How then should we react? 
Perhaps we should point out the role of the Directions, deplore the breaches and note their 
damaging impact in human and jurisprudential terms, discuss the pressures which lead 
(mostly) well-intentioned and dedicated government officers to bad decisions and actions, 
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point out that private litigants also sometime stray from the litigious ideals, and encourage 
our students to form their own views on these issues.  
 
Conclusion:  
The Legal Services Directions 2005 perform an important role in protecting the rule of law 
and encouraging ethical behaviour by Commonwealth government departments engaged in 
litigation by were in behalf of the Commonwealth. 
These Directions set extremely high standards, standards which the ATO has not always - 
regrettably - been able to meet. The decisions and judicial comments in Indooroopilly and 
LVR are stark illustrations of how the pressures of litigation and human frailty can result in 
actions which fall short of the required standards. Such failures involve a complex interplay 
of factors, which offer the opportunity for sophisticated analysis of multidimensional issues. 
As intellectual gatekeepers and moral exemplar is of value systems, academics aware duty to 
their students to embrace the opportunity for analysis of these dynamics in a critical but 
balanced way.  
 
Prof Robin Woellner 
Ms Julie Zetler 
September 2013. 
 
